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In his paper, Clauss proposes that in the college writing classroom, the Toulmin model of
argument is useful because it helps students learn three principles about argument: (1) that claims
need evidentiary support, (2) that argumentation is contextual, and (3) that good argumentation is
multi-sided. And he has illustrated each of his contentions nicely with actual student writing. It
is significant, I think, that he sees the Toulmin model as being helpful only at the level of the
individual paragraph, a microargument within the student’s paper. That is a much more
defensible position than the one presented in a large number of current textbooks on written
argumentation. The tendency of these books is to present the Toulmin model as somehow
enabling a student to write an entire paper in which the thesis is Toulmin’s claim and the
evidence in the paper must somehow tie to that claim by means of a single warrant. Certainly,
Toulmin, Clauss, and I are united in believing that teaching writing students about argument
through Toulmin’s “substantive logic” is far superior to teaching them the syllogism, or (heaven
forbid) propositional logic.
My own position is that one doesn’t need to invoke Toulmin’s terminology or apparatus in
order for students to learn those three principles, and further that other ways of presenting them
are likely to be as effective at less cost. What sort of schemata would I suggest instead? Well,
two come to mind immediately. The first is modern communication theory based on the
“communication triangle” (see Kinneavy 1971). It talks of messages being transmitted from
sender to receiver by means of some shared channel, and of the desirability of certain degrees of
redundancy in the message, and the undesirability of “static.”
But the schema I lean toward is the one Toulmin himself identified as underpinning his work
(“Logic and the Criticism of Arguments,” 1989). In a talk at the University of Michigan in 1982,
Toulmin paid homage to leading thinkers of classical Greek and Roman rhetoric and remarked
that in The Uses of Argument “even though sleepwalkingly—I had rediscovered the topics of
[Aristotle’s] Topics” (380).
Can we derive the same three principles about argument, which Clauss and I both support,
from a classical source? Certainly. Aristotle defined rhetoric as the art of discovering the means
of persuasion available in a given situation, and he spent the bulk of Book II of the Rhetoric
discussing varieties of audience and how to adapt to them. That will work for the idea that
argumentation is always contextual.
As for the idea that claims require support, Aristotle also said that the parts of the oration
were basically two: statement and proof.
Third, he recognized that “proof” may include “the other side,” and this idea became
codified in the more elaborate elements of the Classical Oration as set down by Cicero among
others: Exordium, Propositio, Partitio, Confirmatio, Confutatio, and Peroratio (see Corbett 1965).
For the classical orator, proof for one’s claim wasn’t complete until one had recognized and
devalued the counterarguments of others.
For my money, it is easier and clearer for most college students to understand these ideas as
they are grounded in the Western rhetorical tradition than to attempt to assimilate the newer
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language of Toulmin. Now, I acknowledge that as long as we stick to the terms of “claim,”
“support” (or “data”), “qualifier,” and “rebuttal,” it matters little which set of terms we use.
Since the major weakness in the writing of college students, as identified by experts, is the
failure to support their positions adequately, I use a host of terms and phrases to attempt to get
the need for support to stick: “elaboration,” “evidence,” “judgments need to be accompanied
with facts,” “details,” “development,” “supply specifics,” “give the reader some onces,” and yes
“you need some data.”
The Toulmin model really only becomes problematic when we add the concepts of
“warrant,” “backing,” and with them “field dependence.”
Let’s look for a moment at Clauss’s first student example. Ben writes a descriptive
paragraph about his automobile, a restored 1964 Chevy of which he is proud. And he includes,
as Clauss notes, much supporting detail about the “metallic silver paint,” the V8 283 engine, and
the new dual exhaust system. Clauss says that there are actually two claims, one at the beginning
and one at the end. The beginning sentence/claim reads, “I’m the proud owner of a restored
1964 Chevy Biscayne.” If we do a bit of propositional analysis (which one does not get from
Toulmin), we see that the sentence asserts
1) I own the car.
2) The car has been restored.
3) I am a proud of the car.
The first is presumably a statement of fact—if it were challenged, Ben would have to
produce the appropriate documents. The second synthesizes the various details of the paragraph,
and hence seems to be the “true” claim. The third is a purely expressive statement, perhaps even
a performative utterance: the assertion that one is experiencing the feeling of pride presumably
proves itself. Now if Ben had said, “I have a right to feel proud,” that would be a claim with
some teeth in it.
For each of these claims (as well as for the final one that Ben is “riding in style,”) a different
sort of evidence and a different warrant is appropriate. Or perhaps the details prove the claim
that he rides in a classy automobile, and that claim then becomes the data for “I am proud.”
No warrant is stated, but as Clauss notes, there doesn’t need to be. Given a claim and
support, we can always treat the combination as an enthymeme and derive a warrant of some
sort.
Would there be anything gained from going through that sort of Toulminian analysis with
Ben?? I think Clauss and I would agree that the analysis is overkill. All Ben needs to be
concentrating on is making an assertion and giving enough vivid, relevant details to back it up.
So I suggest that the example paragraph doesn’t tell in either direction whether using a Toulminbased approach helps our students.
After several other examples, Clauss makes an assertion that is at the crux of his position:
“my use of Toulmin’s schema helped the writers see the dynamic structural relationship between
the types of appropriate data, the implied or stated claim, and the implied warrants.” I
respectfully suggest that Clauss here engages in a post hoc fallacy, one common to us as
teachers. He presented some Toulminian concepts, and his students then wrote certain pieces
that can be analyzed—as any argument can—using parts of Toulmin’s model. But what proof is
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there that these students could not have written these same paragraphs in high school, before ever
hearing of Toulmin? Or more to the point, what proof is there that they would have been less
likely to write them had some other set of theory talk, such as that of classical rhetoric, been
used? In a way, Clauss’s next sentence lets the cat out of the bag: “Because each student
understood that ‘good arguments are supported,’ each student generated a specific, focused, and
well-supported micro-argument. No need for Toulmin there.
It interests me that when Clauss moves to discuss “contextuality” and relate it to Toulmin’s
idea of “argument fields,” the example student paragraphs cited earlier would hardly fit. What is
the “context” or “field” within which writing about pride in a retooled car fits? Or in what
“context” or “field” is a personal essay about one’s own personality traits and where they came
from?
Once they reach complete essays, Clauss has his students include on a cover sheet what he
calls a “context statement,” in which they detail audience, role, and purpose. One can surely
relate that to Toulmin’s notion of a “field” with a bit of stretching. But it’s just as easy to
conceive of such a memo to the instructor as growing from the commonly used figure of the
communication triangle, with writer, reader, and world at the angles, and “message” in the center
pulling them together. Or from audience theory itself (see Porter 1992). I have my students fill
out a cover sheet in which they must overtly state the claim they want to make, the question at
issue, and the audience they are addressing, as well as the publication channel by which they
could reach the audience.
Clauss himself says that “asking students to detail their role, audience and overall goal is
nothing new”; but he then turns around and suggests that for the student to consider how each
micro-argument within a paper functions in relationship to the intended audience is somehow
Toulminian. I suggest it isn’t. Rather, it is profoundly rhetorical; rhetors can succeed only by
adapting the means of persuasion to the given audience.
Clauss’s third virtue of Toulmin is that the combination of qualifier and rebuttal conditions
reminds students that all good arguments are multi-sided. Well, yes, but then again no; it isn’t
that simple. If “good” means effective on audiences, then the research on whether presenting a
multi-sided argument will work better is quite mixed. For some audiences, giving a single clear
“side” is more effective. Sometimes bringing up contrary views only to show their weaknesses
rather than to treat them as genuine rebuttal conditions is likely to be effective.
As Clauss details how he reads student papers through Toulmin and thus does a better job
than the “usual readings encouraged in the composition classroom,” I am reminded of a relevant
experience I had in “reading” a student’s paper. It was explicitly addressed to the student body
on my campus, and it argued vehemently that we needed more parking lots. It told stories of
driving around looking for spaces, and finally of having to park four blocks away and then be
late to class. Its qualifier was “certainly.” I gave it a poor grade and suggested that anyone
discussing such an issue needed to consider “the other side” by asking such questions as “Just
how many parking spaces versus parking permits do we have right now,” and “How much would
additional parking lots cost?” I duplicated the paper for class discussion, hoping my students
would point out these same problems. Instead, they all said it was a fine paper and the
administration should act on it.
I was stuck between two theoretical positions about evaluating writing. I claimed that I
wanted my students to write in a way that would suit their audiences. And here my student’s
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audience was most enthusiastic. But in actuality, I wanted my writers to be more analytical,
more logical, quite frankly, to be more “academic” and less “sophistic.” I was reading the same
way Clauss does, though I would not describe it as Toulminian. And while I claimed that I was
trying to put myself into the shoes of the intended audience, I really was not ready to do so. We
academics value multi-sided arguments—in ways that I suggest much of the real world doesn’t.
(Imagine an argument made by GM to purchase a new Pontiac that actually included multiple
viewpoints.)
To finish the story, when I managed to slip some of the weaknesses of the argument into the
class discussion, my students said, “The paper makes a good point. We really liked it.” In one
of those occasions when honesty overcomes pedagogy, I spluttered quite loudly, “Well you
shouldn’t have!!” That’s when I perhaps finally realized that I need to be just as much a teacher
of reading as I am of writing. My point, if there is one, is that we do not always value genuine
adaptation to context (whether viewed from a classical rhetorical perspective or a Toulminian
one). And we can justify our desire to see students consider “the other side” equally well from
either perspective.
And finally, what happens if we attempt to subject Clauss’s paper to a Toulmin analysis?
The claim is certainly clear: Judicious use of the Toulmin model of argument helps the teaching
of writing. And what are the grounds? Well mostly they consist of several pieces of student
texts, which were written presumably after some exposure to Toulmin terms and which can be
analyzed through application of the Toulmin model. Of course one can construct a warrant that
authorizes such a move: something like “If a teacher presents Theory X and students later behave
in ways that are consistent with Theory X, then Theory X deserves credit for their behavior.” A
lot of our outcomes assessments, I suspect, rest on just such a warrant. But it would be truly
difficult to provide appropriate backing for such a post hoc causal claim. Toulmin never claimed
his schema distinguished good arguments from poor ones, merely that it described how
arguments operate. Any student argument at all, including my student’s argument for more
parking, must of necessity fit the model.
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